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I analyze employer recruitment decisions using a dynamic, discrete-choice structural 
model that I estimate on a sample of clerical workers from the MCSUI, a large cross 
section of establishments in 4 metropolitan areas of the U.S.  In the model, employers 
choose either informal recruitment methods (which generate a small but select applicant 
pool from which the employer can hire quickly) or formal methods (which create a large 
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times).  I study the effects of 3 counterfactual simulations on recruitment strategies, 
starting wages, and vacancy durations: a wage subsidy, a policy designed to improve 
information about prospective matches, and an increase in the heterogeneity of 
prospective matches.  I show that the effects of exogenous policy or environmental 
changes can be decomposed into “pure wage effects” that affect the wage offers 
employers post, holding constant their recruitment strategies, and “recruitment-wage 
effects” that involve changes in recruitment methods.  The results show that changes in 
recruitment strategies represent an important channel through which changes in the 
economic environment affect the starting wages and vacancy duration for new hires. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employers and job seekers are brought together for potential matches through 
recruitment and job search activities that help both parties acquire information about the 
other.  The better the information they obtain prior to entering an employment 
relationship the higher the likelihood of a good match.  The crucial role of information in 
the labor market has been recognized since Stigler (1962), but despite a voluminous 
literature on job matching and organizational behavior in labor markets, we know far less 
about employers’ recruitment strategies than about job seekers’ search strategies.  As 
Granovetter (1995, p.155) notes, “while people are finding jobs, employers are finding 
people to fill them, and their behaviors, strategies, and purposes play a central but often 
neglected role in the process of matching people to jobs.”  A dearth of good data 
describing recruitment decisions likely explains the imbalance in research effort.  In this 
paper I analyze employer recruitment strategies using a unique dataset, the Multi-City 
Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a cross-sectional telephone survey of 3510 
establishments in LA, Boston, Detroit and Atlanta, conducted during 1992 – 1995.  
Employers in the survey were asked questions about the most recently hired worker, 
including how long it took to hire this worker, the recruitment methods that were used 
and the one that generated the hire, the worker’s starting wage, and the screening 
methods typically used for hiring workers into that job.1   
 My broad objective in this paper is to provide a framework for analyzing the labor 
market effects of employer recruitment choice.  I propose a dynamic, discrete-choice, 
structural model in which employers choose recruitment strategies and post wage offers 
over time in an effort to fill a job vacancy, solving it numerically and estimating its 
parameters.  To my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate a dynamic structural 
                                                          
1 Telephone screening was used in an effort to identify a respondent who hired the most recently hired 
worker.  The respondent was the owner in 14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a 
personnel department official in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%.  The survey instrument took 30 – 45 
minutes to administer on the telephone, with a response rate of 67% for screened interviews.  Sampling 
weights were constructed to correct for the complexities of the sampling scheme, and weighted 
observations are a representative sample of establishments, such as would occur if a random sample of 
employed people were drawn from each city.  See Holzer (1996) for more information about the data.  
Descriptive analysis of recruitment methods, starting wages, vacancy duration, and skill levels using these 
data is found in DeVaro (2005). 
 
 
 
model of recruitment choice.2  The typical approach taken in previous work is to estimate 
regressions of some labor market outcome, such as wages or vacancy duration, on a set of 
explanatory variables including indicators for various recruitment methods, which are 
assumed exogenous.  A structural representation of the employer’s recruitment problem 
is of interest for the usual reasons.  In particular, it permits analysis of how labor market 
outcomes are affected by changes in the economic environment, accounting for the 
behavioral responses of employers through their recruitment and wage-offer decisions.   
Following the tradition since Rees (1966), Rees and Schultz (1970), and the first 
edition of Granovetter (1995) in 1974, throughout the analysis I distinguish two main 
recruitment strategies.  “Informal methods” involve word-of-mouth referrals from current 
employees or friends, whereas “formal methods” involve other means of recruitment.  
Rees (1966) documented the prevalence of informal methods in recruiting blue and 
white-collar workers in a Chicago-area study and argued that the effectiveness of 
informal networks was under appreciated.  Prior to the work of Rees, the conventional 
view was that formal methods provided better information than informal methods, 
thereby contributing to the efficient functioning of the labor market.  In counterpoint, 
Rees and Schultz (1970, p.221) wrote “… we do not feel that this reliance [on informal 
methods] is necessarily evidence of an imperfect market.  Rather it suggests to us the 
importance of kinds of qualitative information about job seekers and about vacant jobs 
that could not be communicated well through formal channels, such as newspaper ads 
and employment agencies…”  In highlighting the role of recruitment choices as 
information-generating devices, Rees and Schultz distinguished between “extensive 
information”, which pertains to the number of job seekers and vacancies covered by the 
information, and “intensive information”, which provides detailed information about 
specific job seekers or vacancies.  Formal recruiting methods such as advertising are 
effective in generating substantial extensive information, for example a high volume of 
applicants, but the information about individual applicants is usually quite limited.  In 
                                                          
2 Two theoretical papers are worthy of note.  In a job search model focusing on jobseekers’ search 
strategies, Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) considers two distributions of wages, one corresponding to 
job offers obtained when jobseekers use indirect referrals from an employed friend, and the other from 
direct application to an employer.  Montgomery (1991) imbeds social networks in an adverse selection 
model to analyze the effects of social networks on labor market outcomes.   
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contrast, informal methods provide inside information on a small and select group of 
applicants.  Rees and the subsequent literature argued that informal methods can lead to 
better employment matches by generating more intensive information. 
After estimating the parameters of the model, I conduct three counterfactual 
simulations.  The first is a wage subsidy, which increases the attractiveness of hiring a 
worker, inducing employers to shift their recruitment strategies more in the direction of 
informal methods and to post higher wage offers, since both responses increase the per-
period probability of a hire.  The second is an “information policy” (designed to improve 
matches for workers hired through formal channels), which creates a shift towards formal 
recruitment methods, a lower overall starting wage distribution, longer vacancy 
durations, higher starting wages and shorter vacancy durations for those workers hired 
via formal methods, and lower starting wages and longer vacancy durations for workers 
hired via informal methods.  The third is an increase in the degree of heterogeneity in the 
match qualities of prospective hires, which induces substitution from informal to formal 
methods.  Employers who remain with informal methods become more hesitant to raise 
wage offers during the recruitment campaign (since they are less eager to attract matches 
of more uncertain quality), whereas those remaining with formal methods become more 
likely to raise wage offers during the campaign, since the “option value” (which pertains 
only to workers hired via formal methods) is increasing in the variance of match quality.   
For each counterfactual, I decompose the total effects into “pure wage effects” 
(i.e., changes to observed outcomes that would result if employers were forced to remain 
with their pre-policy recruitment choice, responding only by modifying their wage offer 
sequences) and “recruitment-wage effects” (i.e. the change in observed outcomes that 
occurs since some employers switch recruitment strategies in response, thereby altering 
the composition of employers – in terms of their chosen wage-offer sequences – who use 
a given recruitment strategy).  The structural approach allows us to quantify the relative 
importance of these two effects in determining labor market outcomes.  
Although the MCSUI data offer a wealth of information concerning employer 
hiring strategies, some data limitations are worth noting at the outset.  First, for each 
employer all of the information pertains to the most recently hired worker or to the job 
into which this worker was hired, so we lack information on these employers’ hiring 
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strategies more generally.  Second, the data lack information on both the intensity with 
which recruitment and screening methods were used and also (when multiple recruitment 
methods were used) their sequencing.  Third, since we do not observe whether the most 
recent worker was hired alone or with others, I cannot allow for differences in 
recruitment behavior according to how many workers were desired.  The model I propose 
assumes that a single worker is sought, whereas in the data the most recent hire may in 
some cases have been part of a broader hiring campaign. 
The MCSUI contains quite a heterogeneous set of workers, jobs, and skill levels, 
while employer recruitment strategies are likely to vary substantially across different 
types of jobs, even for the same employer.  It is not clear that estimating a structural 
model on a sample that mixes lawyers and bus drivers is a valuable exercise.  For that 
reason, I restrict the analysis to a relatively homogeneous group of workers and jobs, 
namely those listed as “Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical”, which 
is the largest occupational subsample in the MCSUI.  The most recently hired worker was 
a member of this group in 933 cases, and information on the recruitment method that 
generated the most recent hire is available for 917 cases.3     
 
II. BASIC EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS 
Some basic empirical observations serve as a useful starting point and help to 
motivate the economic model.  I present three of these in Table 1.4  First, vacancy 
durations are shorter when clerical workers are generated by informal methods than by 
formal methods.  The average vacancy duration for secretaries hired through informal 
                                                          
3 These numbers are for positions that do not require a college degree.  In the absence of this restriction, the 
numbers would be 992 and 974, respectively.  I drop observations requiring a college degree since such 
jobs are likely to differ substantially from those that do not require a college degree, though conducting the 
analysis on the slightly larger sample yields very similar results to those I report in the paper. 
4 I define informal methods as 1 if the employer responded that the recruitment method that generated the 
most recent hire was either “referrals from current employees” or “referrals from friends”, and 0 if the 
worker was generated via one of the following (formal) methods: newspaper advertisements, help-wanted 
signs, referrals from state employment agencies, referrals from private employment agencies, referrals from 
community employment agencies, referrals from school placement officers, referrals from unions, 
accepting walk-ins, and “other.”  Vacancy duration (in weeks) is the answer to the following question:  
“From the time you began recruiting until you hired someone, how long did it take to hire your newest 
employee?”  The starting wage is the real hourly starting wage in 1990 dollars.  When asked the starting 
wage of the most recent hire, about 70% of employers responded with an hourly wage.  The other 30% 
reported a weekly, monthly, or annual wage, and these I converted to hourly wages assuming standard 
work schedules.  I deflated all hourly wages to 1990 dollars using the CPI-UX.     
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methods was 2.6 weeks, versus 3.6 weeks for those hired through formal methods.  
Second, secretaries hired through informal methods received lower starting wages than 
those hired through formal methods ($7.55 per hour versus $8.10 per hour).  These first 
two basic empirical observations will emerge as predictions of the structural model.  
Third, informal methods generated smaller applicant pools than formal methods.  The 
average number of workers who applied for the position held by the most recent hire was 
26 if the worker was generated by informal methods and 176 if the worker was generated 
by formal methods.  Similarly, the average number of workers who interviewed for the 
position was 8 in the case of informal methods and 11 in the case of formal methods. 
A fourth observation, not reported in Table 1, is that screening of applicants 
appeared to be less intensive when informal recruiting methods were used than when 
formal methods were used.  Employers were asked how often each of the following 5 
screening methods was used for the position into which the most recent worker was 
hired: personal interviews, tests, reference checks, checks of educational record, and 
checks of criminal record.  Possible responses are: “3 = always”, “2 = sometimes” or “1 = 
never.”  Ordered probits of these outcomes on a dummy for whether the most recent hire 
was generated by informal methods yield a negative coefficient for informal methods in 
all 5 models.  The employer was also asked whether a test was required for the position 
and whether a sample of work was required.  Probits of these outcomes on an informal-
methods dummy yield negative coefficients in both cases.  Thus, for all 7 screening 
methods the point estimates indicate less frequent use of screening for the position into 
which the most recent worker was hired if the worker was generated via informal 
methods, though in most cases these differences are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.5   
Table 2 displays further evidence suggesting the possibility of substitution 
between informal recruitment methods and intensive screening.  The estimates are from 
ordered probit models in which the dependent variable equals 0 if the employer reported 
                                                          
5 A likely reason that the statistical evidence is not stronger is that all 7 screening questions unfortunately 
ask about what was done in general for this position, as opposed to what was done in the actual case of the 
most recent hire.  This matters, because employers often use a combination of recruitment methods.  
Suppose the most recently hired secretary was obtained via informal methods but that the same employer 
usually generated secretaries via formal methods.  Then in response to the questions that ask about what 
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that recruiting methods for the position into which the most recent worker was hired were 
less likely to involve informal methods at the time of the survey than 5 to 10 years earlier, 
1 if there had been no change in the use of informal methods during the 5 years preceding 
the survey, and 2 if informal methods were used more often at the time of the survey 
when recruiting to fill such a position than 5 years earlier.  Independent variables are 
binary indicators for whether particular screening methods were used less often at the 
time of the survey than 5 to 10 years ago.  If there is substitution between informal 
recruitment methods and the various screening methods, the coefficients in these ordered 
probit models should be positive.  While many of the effects are estimated with low 
precision, this is indeed the pattern that emerges.  
Employers in the economic model are assumed to post wage offers each period, 
with higher posted wages increasing the per-period hiring probability.6  Some offer high 
wages to lure workers fast, while others offer low wages to reap greater profits per period 
in the event that a worker is hired.  If a recruitment campaign is going badly, some 
employers might raise the offered wage to increase the hiring probability.  However, the 
data contain only starting wages, not offered wages.  Even though the model implies that 
offered wages are non-decreasing over the duration of the recruitment campaign, the 
predicted sign of the correlation between vacancy duration and starting wages is 
ambiguous since high wage offers from the outset are more likely than low wage offers to 
yield a short duration.  If a high starting wage is observed in the data, there is no way to 
determine whether that employer’s offered wage was high from the outset of the 
campaign, or if it started low and was raised later.  Employers who offer high wages from 
the outset are likely to experience shorter vacancy durations than those who start out with 
low wage offers and later switch to high wage offers.   
The point is that in a regression of vacancy duration on starting wages, a positive 
slope coefficient provides no evidence in favor of a wage-posting model or against it.  If 
we restrict our attention to the subsample of employers who hired someone very quickly, 
however, then offered wages are essentially the same as starting wages, since few if any 
employers would have increased their wage offer in such a short time.  In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
screening was typically done for this position, the employer would respond based on a screening strategy 
for an applicant pool usually generated via formal methods. 
6 This is also the case in the model of Albrecht et al. (2006). 
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full sample will contain many employers who raised their wage offer at some point(s) 
during the recruitment campaign.  So a wage-posting model does imply that if we 
estimate such a regression on successive subsamples (i.e. workers hired within the first 
two weeks, within the first three weeks, within the first four weeks, and so on) the slope 
coefficient should increase with the sample size.  Figure 1 supports this hypothesis, and 
as seen in Figure 2, even after controlling for whether the position requires a college 
degree, whether the firm is a franchise, the fraction of unionized employment, 
establishment size, number of sites of operation, and 8 industry indicators, the graph is 
still increasing.7  This pattern is consistent with the wage-posting model I present in the 
next section.  Furthermore, some alternative theories for the process generating starting 
wages – such as ex-post bargaining – would not have this pattern.  Nonetheless, the 
increasing pattern might also reflect unobserved heterogeneity in posted vacancies. 
 
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF EMPLOYER RECRUITMENT CHOICE  
I model the problem an employer faces in filling a single vacancy.  The basic 
framework is a search model in which the employer commits to a recruitment strategy at 
the outset of a three-period recruitment campaign and posts wage offers at the start of 
each period, until a hire occurs, to maximize expected profit.8  I treat the jobseeker side 
of the labor market as exogenous.  At the start of the first period the employer chooses 
one of two recruitment strategies, (either “informal methods”, denoted I, or “formal 
methods”, denoted F), and simultaneously posts either a high wage offer, WH, or a low 
wage offer, WL.  In each period for which the position remains vacant, a hire occurs with 
probability pI(w) if informal methods were chosen and with probability pF(w) if formal 
methods were chosen, where pj(w) = pjH if w = WH, and pj(w) = pjL if w = WL, for j = I,F.  
Informal methods yield greater hiring probabilities, as do higher wage offers.  Thus, I 
                                                          
7 Figures 1 and 2 use the full MCSUI sample, though restricting the sample to clerical workers yields the 
same pattern of results. 
8 A three-period formulation allows for a simple estimation scheme, by maintaining a small number of 
discrete outcomes, while adequately capturing the dynamics of the economic problem.  The data reveal that 
most recruitment campaigns last only a few weeks.  As a practical matter, employers do not continuously 
change offered wages during this time.  The three-period formulation allows an initial wage offer and two 
opportunities to adjust the offer as the recruitment campaign progresses.  
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assume pF(WL) < {pF(WH) and pI(WL)} < pI(WH). 9  I impose no ordering on pF(WH) and 
pI(WL).  If a hire does not occur in the first period, the employer can post a new wage 
offer at the start of periods 2 and 3, though the original recruitment choice remains 
fixed.10  This assumption is reasonable for the relatively short recruitment campaigns that 
are observed for the vast majority of clerical workers in these data.  In a typical case, 
organizations have established procedures for recruiting new secretaries.  A salary range 
is often posted.  The chosen recruitment strategies generate a flow of applicants and 
interviews over time.  The model captures the idea that when the campaign does not end 
quickly the employer (or HR department) becomes more likely to offer a wage towards 
the higher end of the range.  
Once hired, a worker remains with the employer through the end of the third 
period, and profits are normalized to zero thereafter.11  Let θI and θF denote non-negative, 
                                                          
9 The assumption that, for a given wage offer, informal methods yield greater hiring probabilities than 
formal methods is motivated by the empirical evidence in Section II that vacancy durations are shorter 
when workers are generated by informal methods than by formal methods.  A natural interpretation, 
suggested by the evidence in Section II, is that formal methods take longer to generate applicants and that 
time must be invested in intensive screening of an applicant pool that is larger and of lower average quality 
than one generated via informal methods. 
10 An alternative assumption is that employers begin with informal methods, turning to formal methods 
only if informal methods fail.  Employers may have a stock of “search capital” (i.e. a stock of phone calls 
they can make) which they exhaust before resorting to formal methods that are costlier than informal 
methods in some dimension.  To fully address this idea would require data on the sequencing of the chosen 
recruitment methods.  While such data are lacking in the MCSUI, the combination of data on chosen 
recruitment methods in conjunction with the methods that actually generated the worker allows me to 
produce some basic empirical facts that seem inconsistent with this alternative explanation.   
First, if we consider the subsample of secretaries from the analysis sample that were generated via 
formal methods, the fraction of these recruitment campaigns for which informal recruitment methods were 
also chosen (even though they failed to generate the hire) should be 100 percent if the alternative 
explanation is correct.  In fact it is under 79 percent, indicating that in a non-trivial fraction of cases (over 
20 percent) the employer relied exclusively on formal methods from the outset, without even attempting to 
draw down a stock of “search capital” by soliciting informal referrals from current employees and friends.  
In the other cases, we know nothing about the sequencing, so it might be that informal methods are chosen 
first, and it might not.   
Second, if we look at the entire analysis sample of 770 on which the structural model is estimated, 
the fraction of secretaries generated via formal methods is 0.666.  Now, if we further restrict the sample to 
the 591 observations for which both informal and formal methods were both chosen in the campaign, then 
(according to the alternative explanation) we should see that the fraction of secretaries ultimately generated 
via formal methods far exceeds 0.666.  This is because, according to the alternative argument, the employer 
only switches to formal methods once it becomes clear that informal methods are not working, so 
conditional on the event that the employer switches to formal methods the probability that the hire will 
ultimately be generated via formal methods should be extremely high.  In fact, it remains exactly 0.666.  
11 An alternative assumption would be that, once hired, a worker remains with the employer forever.  Much 
of the analysis (including Propositions 1 and 2 describing employer behavior) remains unchanged under 
this alternative assumption, though the empirical model under this alternative assumption does not fit the 
data quite as well as the model under the assumption in the present analysis.  
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continuously-distributed, stochastic match qualities of workers from the applicant pools 
generated by informal methods and formal methods, respectively.  The moments of θI and 
θF are assumed to exist.  The employer observes the distributions from which θI and θF 
are drawn (both lognormal in the empirical work) but never observes the realized values 
of these match qualities.  Hence, there is no basis for employer-induced separations, and 
negative realized profits are possible, though I assume the expected profit from searching 
is positive whenever a vacancy exists.12  There are no separations in the model.13   
In the spirit of Rees (1966) and the subsequent literature, I assume that (prior to 
screening of applicants) informal methods yield better matches, on average, than formal 
methods, so that E(θI) = μ > E(θF) = 1, though Var(θI) = Var(θF).  Formal methods, on the 
other hand, generate large applicant pools to which intensive screening methods are then 
applied, as suggested by the basic empirical observations in Section II.  I model this 
increased selectivity from a larger applicant pool by allowing an employer using formal 
methods to take the best of two draws from a two-applicant pool, given that a hire occurs 
in that period.  While the employer never observes realized match qualities, if formal 
methods are chosen he observes which of the two draws for the prospective hires is 
larger.14,15   
                                                          
12 Sufficient conditions to ensure that this condition always holds in the empirical analysis are provided at 
the end of the first paragraph of Section IV.   
13 An extension of the model to incorporate exogenous separations would be straightforward.  Since the 
sample I use to estimate the model consists of the ost recently hired orker at each establishment, 
relatively few separation  are ob erved.   
 m w
s s
14 Note that I assume E[θI] > E[θF] rather than E[θI] > E[θF(2)], where θF(2) denotes the second order statistic 
based on two draws from the distribution of θF.  Thus, the assumption is that on a pre-screening basis, 
informal methods yield higher-quality matches on average than formal methods.  But the larger applicant 
pool associated with formal methods allows intensive screening (modeled as taking the maximum of two 
draws).  If the alternative inequality were imposed instead, the firm would always choose informal 
methods, and the model could not be estimated.   
15 The assumption of common variance in the (pre-screening) match quality distributions is not as 
restrictive as it might appear.  Note that the post-screening match quality distributions, which are the ones 
relevant to the hiring decision and to estimation, are such that the one for formal methods has a lower 
variance (due to sampling the second order statistic) than the one for informal methods.  Thus, the key 
assumption is merely that, after screening, match qualities are lower variance for formal methods than for 
informal.  This seems plausible, particularly given the descriptive evidence from Section II suggesting that 
employers screen secretaries more intensively when they recruit using formal methods.  The point is that 
while relying on someone's informal recommendation might be quite informative, it is generally less 
informative than testing potential hires yourself in an interview (particularly in the context of secretaries).  
One could imagine an alternative set of assumptions on the variances of the pre-screening match quality 
distributions that would be compatible with assumptions I have made on the post-screening match quality 
distributions, since it is only the latter distributions that are relevant to the estimation.        
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Once hired, in each period of employment the worker receives the wage offered in 
the hiring period and produces net revenue of (MθI)γ if hired via informal methods and 
(MθF(2))γ if hired via formal methods, where M ≥ 1 denotes the deterministic component 
of the labor input, θF(2) denotes the second order statistic based on two draws from the 
distribution of θF, and γ is a parameter between 0 and 1 that has density g(γ) in the 
population of employers.16  Thus, while it is the expectation of a concave function of θI 
that is the relevant consideration when choosing informal methods, it is the expectation of 
a concave function of θF(2) that is relevant when choosing formal methods.  I also assume 
E(θI)γ > WL/Mγ ׊γ, so that for all employers, choosing informal methods and a low wage 
offer guarantees positive expected profit from searching in each period for which a 
vacancy exists. 
 Formally, let j denote an index of the recruitment strategies (I and F), T the 
number of periods (i.e. T = 3), β the one-period discount factor, and χI(j) an indicator 
function equaling 1 if j = I and 0 if j = F.  I denote each branch of the value function, V, 
as Vtj, for t = 1,2,3 and j = I,F.  Thus, V = max[V1I,V1F], where 
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I compute the solution to the employer’s problem numerically via backward induction.  
The following two propositions describe employer behavior (see Appendix A for proofs):  
Proposition 1:  Let j and t index recruitment strategies and periods.  Given the parameters 
and the choice of recruitment strategy j, there exist thresholds, γjt, in [0,1], such that in 
period t, employer i posts a wage offer of WH if γi > γjt and a wage offer of WL if γi < γjt, 
and these thresholds are such that 0 ≤ γj3 ≤ γj2 ≤ γj1 ≤ 1.  If and only if the parameters are 
such that 0 < γj3 < γj2 < γj1 < 1 for recruitment strategy j, then each of the four possible 
wage-offer sequences – i.e. (WL, WL, WL), (WL, WL, WH), (WL, WH, WH), (WH, WH, WH) 
– could occur in the labor market if recruitment strategy j is chosen. 
 
Proposition 2:  Recruitment strategy j is said to be potentially observable in the labor 
market if and only if the parameters of the model are such that Prob(γ ∈  {γ: employer 
chooses recruitment strategy j}) > 0.  Let γ*IFk denote the kth threshold value of γ such that 
there exist non-negative ε1 and ε2 such that employer i chooses informal methods if γi ∈  
{γ:  γ*IFk – ε1 < γ < γ*IFk }, formal methods if γi ∈  {γ:  γ*IFk < γ < γ*IFk + ε2}, and is 
indifferent between the two methods if γi = γ*IFk.  Similarly, let γ*FIk denote the kth 
threshold value of γ such that there exist non-negative ε1 and ε2 such that employer i 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 Employer heterogeneity in this model is captured by γ.  A central question in the literature on job search 
and wage-posting games is whether the wage distribution implied by the economic model is non-
degenerate and what mechanism generates wage dispersion.  In this model, employer heterogeneity in γ 
implies dispersion in the equilibrium distribution of starting wages.   
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chooses formal methods if γi ∈  {γ:  γ*FIk – ε1 < γ < γ*FIk }, informal methods if γi ∈  {γ:  
γ*FIk < γ < γ*FIk + ε2}, and is indifferent between the two methods if γi = γ*FIk.  Then, given 
the parameters of the model, the following statements describe employer recruitment 
behavior:   
1) For every value of γ in the interval [0,1], either the employer chooses informal 
methods, or formal methods, or is indifferent between the two methods. 
2) Either formal methods are the only potentially observable strategy in the labor 
market, or informal methods are the only potentially observable strategy, or 
formal and informal methods are both potentially observable.  Furthermore, the 
parameters of the model are such that both recruitment strategies are potentially 
observable if and only if there exists at least one threshold of type γ*IFk or of type 
γ*FIk in the interval (0,1).      
3) If both recruitment methods are potentially observable in the labor market, the set 
of all thresholds of type γ*IFk or γ*FIk partitions the interval [0,1] into subintervals 
that alternate between the two methods. 
 Proposition 1 says that the sequence of posted wage offers is non-decreasing for 
either recruitment strategy and that the 3 thresholds γjt partition the interval [0,1] into 4 
regions corresponding to the 4 possible wage-offer sequences given recruitment choice j.  
As the degree of concavity in the production function decreases, employers are more 
willing to post high wage offers earlier in the recruitment campaign.  Intuitively, since 
expected revenue given that a hire occurs is monotonically increasing in γ for either 
recruitment strategy, as γ increases employers are increasingly eager to fill the position, 
and since the recruitment strategy is fixed once it is chosen, they can raise the per-period 
hiring probability only by posting higher wage offers.  Proposition 2 says that every 
employer-type chooses to search and that the [0,1] interval can, as long as at least one γ* 
threshold lies in (0,1), be partitioned into regions of γ that alternate between the two 
recruitment strategies as γ increases from 0 to 1.  Note that Proposition 1 does not say 
that if 0 < γj3 < γj2 < γj1 < 1 then all 4 possible wage sequences could potentially be seen in 
the labor market.  As the last phrase of Proposition 1 indicates, that is true only if 
recruitment strategy j is chosen, meaning (given the result in Proposition 2) that each of 
γj3, γj2, and γj1 lies in a γ*-interval for which recruitment strategy j is the optimal choice.   
 Exogenous policy or environmental changes that affect the parameters of the 
model potentially change both the γ* thresholds and the γjt thresholds, thereby altering 
both the chosen recruitment strategy and the chosen wage-offer sequence (given the 
recruitment choice) for the employer.  This suggests that the total effect of a policy on 
observed outcomes (such as the distributions of starting wages and vacancy duration) can 
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be decomposed into two effects.  The first I call the “pure wage effect”, which is the 
change to observed outcomes that would occur if employers were forced to remain with 
their original (pre-policy) recruitment choice, thereby responding to the policy only by 
modifying wage-offer sequences.  The second I call the “recruitment-wage effect”, which 
is the change to observed outcomes that occurs since some employers switch recruitment 
strategies in response to the policy change, thereby altering the composition of employers 
(in terms of their chosen wage-offer sequences) who use a given recruitment strategy.  
The wage effect is the change in the distributions of observed outcomes resulting from 
changes in the thresholds γF3, γF2, γF1, γI3, γI2, and γI1, holding the γ* thresholds fixed.  The 
recruitment-wage effect results from changes in the γ* thresholds.   
The decomposition illustrates the point that endogenous changes in recruitment 
strategies in response to changes in the economic environment have implications for the 
distributions of starting wages and vacancy duration.  The magnitudes of the shifts in 
wage-offer sequences and recruitment strategies depend on the distribution of employer 
types, in particular the concentration of “marginal” employers that have values of γ in the 
neighborhood of the various γjt or γ* thresholds.  The greater the concentration of such 
employers the greater the magnitude of the shifts in observed outcomes that occur 
following a change in the economic environment.  This density of employer types, g(γ), 
is determined by the parameters αγ and βγ.  In Section V, I consider three counterfactual 
simulations to illustrate the decomposition of total effects into wage effects and 
recruitment-wage effects.   
  
IV. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The identification problem is to infer from a joint distribution of recruitment 
choices, starting wages, and vacancy durations a joint distribution of match quality and 
employer heterogeneity parameters plus per-period hiring probabilities.  The sources of 
identification include the cross-sectional, retrospective variation observed in the data, 
along with the distributional assumptions (including independence of all the stochastic 
components) and the various assumptions of the economic model.  I assume that the 
match qualities, θI and θF, are distributed lognormal with means of E(θF) = 1 and E(θI) = 
μ > 1 and a common variance of σ2.  I assume that γi, the employer-type parameter for 
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establishment i, is a draw from the beta distribution with (positive) shape parameters αγ 
and βγ.17  I fix values for WH and WL.  Earnings over a 3-week period based on a 40-hour 
week and a wage of $9.42 per hour (roughly the 75th percentile of the starting wage 
distribution) are $1130.40.  The same calculation based on a wage of $6.27 per hour 
(roughly the 25th percentile of the starting wage distribution) yields $740.40.  Scaling 
both by dividing by 1000 yields WH = 1.1304 and WL = 0.7404.  Given the assumptions 
θI ~ LN(μ,σ2), μ > 1, M ≥ 1, and WL < 1, unless σ is extremely large the condition 
ensuring that employers can make positive expected profit from searching (by choosing 
informal methods and a low wage offer) holds for all values of γ.  More precisely, as 
shown in Appendix A, the condition is σ < μ[exp(m) – 1]1/2, where m = 
2ln((Mμ)γ/WL)/[γ(1 – γ)].  This constraint on σ is not binding in the estimation.      
Let ξ denote the 9×1 vector of parameters to be estimated, i.e. ξ’ = [M, αγ, βγ, μ, 
σ, pIH, pIL, pFH, pFL].  The moments from the data that help to identify each parameter are 
the observed frequencies of the 14 possible outcomes implied by the economic model: 3 
hiring periods × 2 recruitment strategies × 2 wage levels + 2 ways in which the vacancy 
could remain unfilled by the end of the third period.  These frequencies are displayed in 
Table 4.  If the most recently hired worker was hired in 0 to 3 weeks I define the hire as 
occurring in period 1.  Periods 2 and 3 correspond to hiring times of 4 to 6 weeks and 7 to 
9 weeks, respectively.18  I define the recruitment strategy as “informal” if the most recent 
hire was generated either by referrals from current employees or by referrals from 
friends; otherwise it is “formal.”  If the starting wage is above (below) the median of 
$7.46 per hour I define the starting wage as “high” (“low”).   
A simple way to illustrate which moments from the data help to identify each 
parameter is via comparative statics exercises that plot the changes in the simulated 
                                                          
17 As an alternative distributional assumption, I also tried γi = Φ(xi), where xi ~ N(μγ,σγ2) and Φ is the 
standard normal cdf.  I found results roughly similar to those I report here.  In particular, the distribution of 
employer types was “U-shaped” with a lot of mass concentrated in the extremes of the [0,1] interval, 
particularly near 0.  The fit of the model was slightly worse using this alternative distributional assumption, 
as gauged by chi-square tests of goodness-of-fit; the minimized distance function was 0.0024, as opposed 
to 0.0023 for the results reported here using the beta distribution. 
18 The survey question asks the employer how many weeks it took “from the time you began recruiting 
until you hired someone” to hire the most recently hired worker.  Since a hire occurred in all cases the data 
are a sample of completed recruitment spells.  Note that because the sample is one of completed spells as 
opposed to current and completed spells, no problems of length-biased sampling arise given that 
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distributions of recruitment strategies, starting wages, and vacancy durations that result 
from varying one of the parameters while fixing the others.  I do this using 10,000 draws 
and a window of plus or minus 2 percent of the original value for the parameter being 
varied.  This window is small enough that the hiring probabilities retain the correct 
ordering and all lie between 0 and 1, and E(θI) > E(θF).  Since I vary each parameter from 
its estimated value, holding the other parameters fixed at their estimated values, for the 
purpose of this discussion I take the parameter estimates in Tables 3 as given (as well as 
Tables 4 and 5, and Figure 3, all of which are implied by the estimates in Table 3).  Later 
in the section I explain the estimation procedure and discuss the resulting estimates.  I 
now summarize the comparative statics results which, since they are based on the 
estimated parameters, should be viewed as specific to this choice of parameter values, 
though they may in fact be more general.19     
The percentage of employers choosing informal recruitment methods is 
decreasing in the employer-type parameter αγ, whereas the percentage starting at the high 
wage is increasing in αγ.  Thus, comparing establishments with informal methods and 
high starting wages to those with formal methods and low starting wages aids in the 
identification of αγ.  The three vacancy duration variables do not vary monotonically with 
αγ, and therefore observed variation in these variables does not contribute to 
identification of αγ.  To see why the percent using informal recruitment methods helps to 
identify αγ, note that a beta distribution with shape parameters αγ < βγ < 1 is U-shaped but 
asymmetric, with more of the mass located near 0 than 1, and that it becomes more 
symmetric as αγ increases, until it reaches symmetry about ½ when αγ = βγ < 1.  Note also 
that when αγ < βγ = 1 the distribution is monotonically decreasing, rather than U-shaped, 
on [0,1], and that is nearly the case in the histogram for γ in Figure 3, since the estimate 
of βγ exceeds 0.96.  As revealed by the implied γ* thresholds in the first column of Table 
5, very high (low) values of γ imply that formal (informal) methods are chosen.  Thus, 
holding the other parameters constant, as αγ increases the probability mass in the 
neighborhood of γ = 0 decreases, resulting in substitution from informal to formal 
methods.  The intuition for the relationship between αγ and the percentage starting at the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
stationarity is assumed.  The bulk of the recruitment campaigns were completed in 9 weeks or less.  Using 
4-week periods instead of 3-week periods yields similar results.  
19 The full set of plots is available from the author upon request. 
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high wage is similar.  Holding the other parameters constant, increasing αγ implies higher 
values of γ, on average, which increases the fraction of employers with values of γ 
exceeding the γ-thresholds in the first column of Table 5 that define cutoffs for wage 
offers, given the recruitment choice.  
 Similar reasoning applies to βγ, the second of the two shape parameters in the beta 
distribution of employer types.  The percent using informal methods is increasing and the 
percent starting at the high wage is decreasing in βγ, where as the hiring durations do not 
vary monotonically with βγ.  As mentioned, when βγ increases to a value equal to or 
greater than 1 while the other parameters remain fixed, the distribution of γ changes from 
an asymmetric U-shape to monotonically decreasing, so the probability mass in the 
neighborhood of 1 decreases.  Since the highest values of γ are associated with formal 
methods, such a change generates substitution from formal to informal methods.  
Similarly, the change decreases the fraction of employers with values of γ exceeding the 
γ-thresholds in the first column of Table 5 that define cutoffs for wage offers, given the 
recruitment choice, so the percent starting at the high wage diminishes.       
 Increases in M, the deterministic component of the labor input, imply increases in 
the percent using informal methods, the percent starting at the high wage, and the percent 
hired in the first period, and decreases in the percent hired in period 2 and the percent 
hired in period 3.  These patterns are easily understood given that higher values of M 
increase per-period profit given that a hire occurs.  This increases the relative 
attractiveness of informal methods and high wage offers, both of which yield faster hires.   
Increases in σ, the standard deviation of the (pre-screening) match quality 
distributions, imply decreases in the percent using informal methods, the percent starting 
at the high wage, and the percent hired in the first period, and increases in the percent 
hired in period 2 and the percent hired in period 3.  To see why variation in recruitment 
methods helps to identify this parameter, note that if the match quality distributions 
become degenerate the employer would always choose informal methods (since per-
period hiring probabilities are greater and since EθI > EθF).  The benefits to the employer 
of using formal methods increase in σ since the expected value of the second order 
statistic is increasing in the variance of the underlying random variable.  This explains 
why increases in σ imply decreases in the percent using informal methods.   
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Increases in μ, the mean of θI, imply increases in the percent using informal 
methods, the percent starting at the high wage, and the percent hired in period 1, and 
decreases in the percent hired in period 2 and the percent hired in period 3.  Since an 
increase in μ amounts to an increase in the average match quality of workers hired via 
informal methods (leaving unchanged the average match quality of workers hired via 
formal methods) it is expected that the percent using informal methods is increasing in μ.   
Finally, the per-period hiring probabilities (pIH, pIL, pFH, pFL) display the obvious 
patterns.  That is, an increase in one of the hiring probabilities pertaining to informal 
(formal) methods raises the percent hired via informal (formal) methods, and an increase 
in one of the hiring probabilities pertaining to the high (low) wage offer increases 
(decreases) the percent starting at the high wage. 
While the preceding discussion helps to illustrate the mechanics of the model, the 
parameter values are changed ceteris paribus and, thus, the comparative statics exercises 
are not fully convincing about the joint identification of all the structural parameters.  
Therefore, I now discuss the results of some Monte-Carlo experiments in which all 
parameters are allowed to vary.  Given the parameter estimates in Table 3, I generated 
100 data sets (each of size 5000) and estimated the model on each data set.  For each of 
the 100 resulting vectors of parameter estimates, I then generated one data set based on 
the estimated parameters and another data set based on the estimated parameters (but 
increasing parameter j by 2 percent), computing the resulting change in the percent using 
informal recruiting methods, the percent starting at the high wage, the percent hired in 
period 1, the percent hired in period 2, and the percent hired in period 3.20  I repeated this 
process for each of the 9 parameters, using data sets of size 10,000 in all cases.   
Table 6 summarizes the results.  In cell ij, the entry in the first line gives the 
average (across the 100 Monte Carlo replications) of the marginal effect of a 2 percent 
increase in parameter (row) i on moment (column) j, whereas the entry in the last line (in 
italics) gives the analogous marginal effect based on the parameter estimates from Table 
3 that were derived using the real data.21  All reported numbers are multiplied by 100 for 
easier reading.  In most cases the mean marginal effect across the Monte Carlo 
                                                          
20 Results were similar using 1 percent increases instead of 2 percent increases. 
21 Also, the median and standard deviation of the marginal effects across the 100 Monte Carlo replications 
are in brackets and parentheses, respectively.   
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replications is roughly similar to the marginal effect based on the parameter estimates 
derived from the real data, and both are generally consistent with the plots underlying the 
comparative statics exercises previously summarized.  The sign differs between the 
marginal effect from the real data and the average marginal effect across the Monte Carlo 
experiments only in one case (the marginal effect of α1 on the percent hired in period 3), 
and here it should be recalled that in the preceding discussion of the comparative statics 
exercises it was noted that this parameter was related to variation in the percent using 
informal methods and the percent starting at the high wage but not to the duration 
variables.   
In summary, while the discussion of comparative statics held each of the other 8 
parameters constant while considering the marginal effect of parameter j, the Monte 
Carlo exercises reveal that those results are not sensitive to the particular configuration of 
the other 8 parameters, since the results are generally similar when averaged across many 
alternative configurations of the other 8 parameters.  
 
Estimation Strategy 
I estimate the parameters by the method of simulated moments.  Let π be a 13-
dimensional vector of linearly independent cell frequencies observed in the data 
(computed using sampling weights), and let πs(ξ) be the corresponding vector of 
simulated cell frequencies predicted by the economic model.  Given an initial parameter 
vector ξ0, I first generate an employer type by taking a pseudo-random draw from the 
distribution of γ.  I then solve the value function by backward induction to compute the 
employer’s optimal recruitment strategy and wage-offer sequence.  Since the stochastic 
match qualities are unobserved by the employer, decisions are based only on moments of 
their probability distribution rather than on realized values of match quality.  Given the 
optimal recruitment choices and wage-offer sequences, the hiring probabilities are 
known.  To determine whether a worker is hired in a given period, I generate a pseudo-
random draw from the uniform [0,1] distribution.  If the draw is less than the relevant 
hiring probability a worker is assumed to be hired in that period.  Thus, combining the 
employer’s optimal choices with the stochastic hiring process, I assign this simulated 
observation to the appropriate cell.  Using the same ξ0, the process is repeated 999 times 
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to produce the empirical frequency for each cell.  The kth element of πs(ξ) is the fraction 
of simulated observations that fall into the kth cell.  The distance function to be 
minimized is Q = (π-πs(ξ))’M(π-πs(ξ)), where the optimal weighting matrix, M, is:22  
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where δi = [δ1i,δ2i, …, δ13i]’, δki = 1 if the ith observation in the data is in cell k and 0 
otherwise, sampling weights are denoted by ω, and the sample size is N = 770.23  An 
attractive feature of the optimal weighting matrix is that it is fixed, rather than a function 
of ξ, and this facilitates estimation.24    
Table 3 displays the parameter estimates, and Table 4 displays information on 
goodness of fit.  Under the null that the data were generated by the economic model, the 
statistic 0.5×Q×N is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom (n-
                                                          
22 Define the normalized sampling weight, ωi*, corresponding to the ith observation as follows:   
ωi* = ωi/Σωi.  Let π0 denote the true (population) cell frequencies, given the true (population) value of ξ, 
while π denotes the observed cell frequencies from the data, weighted by ωi*.  If N1/2(π - π0) is to converge 
in distribution to a mean-zero normal random variable, it must be verified that N1/2(Σωi*δi - π0) = 
N1/2Σωi*(δi - π0).  But this follows directly from the fact that the normalized sampling weights, ωi*, sum to 
1, implying Σωi*π0 = π0.  The outer product matrix for N1/2Σωi*(δi - π0) is given by  
[N1/2Σωi*(δi - π0)][ N1/2Σωi*(δi - π0)]’, or NΣωi*2(δi - π0) (δi - π0)’, the inverse of which is the optimal 
weighting matrix.  Since π0 is unobserved, a feasible estimator of the optimal weighting matrix substitutes a 
consistent estimator for π0, namely π, yielding M = [NΣωi*2(δi - π) (δi - π)’]-1.  Substituting ωi* = ωi/Σωi 
gives the expression for M given in the text.    
23 The sample size is reduced from 917 to 805 due to missing values in the wage and vacancy duration 
variables.  From the 805 I drop a small fraction (about 4 percent) of recruitment campaigns with extremely 
long durations, yielding an analysis sample of 770.  I do this for two reasons.  First, the assumption of the 
model that the employer cannot switch recruitment strategies during a campaign becomes less tenable for 
recruitment campaigns of very long duration.  Second, the three-point duration distribution I assume has 
difficulty describing an observed distribution with an extremely long right tail.  If the model is estimated on 
all 805 observations, the qualitative results are similar to those I report here.  However, the fit of the model 
deteriorates due to poor matching of predicted to observed frequencies in the cells corresponding to 
recruitment campaigns lasting longer than 3 periods.   
24 The method of simulated moments estimator of ξ is ξMSM = argmin Q(ξ).  The distance function is 
minimized using the DFP and Newton algorithms in the constrained optimization routine in GAUSS.  All 
stochastic draws are taken using GAUSS’s pseudo-random number generators.  While a closed form 
expression is available for E(θI)γ, solving the value function also necessitates computing E(θF(2))γ, and I do 
this using Gauss-Legendre quadrature.    
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k-1), where Q is the value of the minimized distance function (0.0023), N is the sample 
size (770), n is the number of cells, and k is the number of estimated parameters.  The 
model cannot be rejected on the basis of a chi-square goodness-of-fit test (p-value = 
0.926).  The parameter estimates seem plausible and are estimated with high precision. 
Several points are worth noting.  First, for either recruitment strategy the estimated hiring 
probability when a high wage is posted is substantially higher than when a low wage is 
posted.  Second, when a high wage is posted the hiring probability when informal 
methods are chosen is substantially higher than when formal methods are chosen, but 
when a low wage is posted the hiring probability for informal methods only slightly 
exceeds the one for formal methods.  Third, the estimated hiring probability when formal 
methods are used with a high wage substantially exceeds the one when informal methods 
are used with a low wage; recall that both probabilities were unconstrained relative to 
each other in estimation, though they were both constrained to lie in the interval (pFL, 
pIH).  Fourth, the standard deviation of the match quality distributions is small relative to 
the mean.  This arises because the value to the employer of sampling the second order 
statistic of θF (i.e. choosing formal methods) increases rapidly in σ, so formal methods 
completely dominate informal methods unless the magnitude of σ is modest.  Fifth, as 
discussed earlier, βγ is slightly below 1 whereas αγ is significantly smaller, and this 
implies a distribution of γ that has an asymmetric U-shape, with a lot of probability mass 
near 0, and that is nearly monotonically decreasing.  This can be seen in Figure 3, in a 
histogram for γ based on 400,000 draws.  The figure also displays the graphs of V1I and 
V1F, given the estimated parameter values, as well as the implied γ* thresholds that are 
also displayed in the first column of Table 5.  The graph of the value function, V, is the 
outer envelope of V1I and V1F in Figure 3.   
Since the analysis in this paper is restricted to clerical workers, it is worth asking 
whether the results would change much if a different occupational group were used 
instead.  To address this question, I aggregate the largest occupational categories (other 
than clerical) to consider workers in “marketing, sales, and service” occupations who are 
employed in positions that do not require a college degree.  Though there are some 
differences, the structural estimates obtained from this subsample do not differ 
dramatically from those in Table 3, suggesting applicability of the analysis of the paper 
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beyond the context of clerical workers.  Appendix B presents the estimates (in Table B.2) 
and some further details.   
       
V. COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
Returning to the analysis of clerical workers, I now consider 3 counterfactual 
simulations: a wage subsidy, an “information policy” designed to improve match 
qualities for workers hired via formal methods, and an increase in the degree of labor 
market heterogeneity in prospective match qualities.  I compare each counterfactual to a 
baseline (or pre-policy) case.  To produce the baseline case, given the parameter 
estimates in Table 3 I generate 5000 draws of γ, and for each draw I solve the value 
function by backward induction to find the optimal recruitment strategies and wage offers 
for that employer-type.  I then combine these optimal choices with the random draws 
representing the stochastic hiring decisions, to compute vacancy duration and starting 
wages.  Since the particular policies in the first two counterfactuals I consider were 
enacted in 1997 and 1998, whereas the data were collected between 1992 and 1995, it is 
reasonable to interpret the parameter estimates in Table 3 and the resulting baseline 
simulations as describing a pre-policy state of the world.  For each counterfactual 
simulation I illustrate the decomposition of the total effect of a change in the economic 
environment into “pure wage effects” and “recruitment-wage effects”. 
 
Simulation 1: Hiring Incentives (WOTC)  
Wage subsidies such as the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), introduced in 
1997, and the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit, (WtWTC), introduced in 1998, provide tax 
incentives to employers to hire low-skilled workers traditionally seen as facing 
significant barriers to employment.25  I model the WOTC as an exogenous one-time 
                                                          
25 The WOTC provides federal income tax credits directly to businesses that hire eligible individuals from 
various target groups.  The maximum credit for new hires working at least 400 hours is 40% of the first 
$6000 of wages, yielding a maximum credit of $2400.  The Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit provides federal 
tax credits directly to businesses that hire workers who have received AFDC benefits for at least eighteen 
months prior to the hiring date.  The other eligibility requirements are the same as those for the WOTC.  
Employers may claim either the WOTC or the WtWTC for a new hire but not both.  The WtWTC is 35% 
of the first $10,000 of wages in the first year of employment and 50% of the first $10,000 of wages in the 
second year, yielding a maximum credit of $8500 per employee.  The new hire must complete a minimum 
of 400 hours or 180 days of employment for the employer to qualify for the credit.     
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transfer, received by the employer at the time of hiring, in the amount of nearly five 
percent of the total earnings of the average new hire in her first two years on the job.26  
This is the maximum credit an employer could receive under the WOTC.  Results from 
the more generous WtWTC would be qualitatively similar, but larger in magnitude.   
Some caveats are worth noting in interpreting this counterfactual as a measure of 
the actual predicted effects of the WOTC.  First, wage subsidies can be expected to have 
general equilibrium effects that are not captured by this partial equilibrium model that 
holds constant all worker behavior.  Second, the WOTC applies only to targeted worker 
types, whereas the simulations apply the subsidy to all workers in a homogenous sample 
of clerical workers.  A model that differentiates workers by type would be needed to 
address the issue of substitution between workers targeted by the policy and those not 
targeted (DeVaro 2001).  Third, the counterfactual assumes that the employer collects the 
maximum subsidy as soon as the worker is hired, whereas in reality the worker must 
remain with the employer for two years for the maximum subsidy to be obtained.  In 
reality, the expectation of turnover during the first two years of employment will reduce 
the expected benefit of the subsidy from the employer’s perspective.      
The changes in the thresholds in Table 5 between columns 1 and 2 reveal that the 
WOTC induces a shift towards informal recruitment methods (because γ*IF1 and γ*IF2 
increase while γ*FI1 decreases) and towards wage-offer sequences favoring higher posted 
wage offers, regardless of recruitment choice (because the γ-thresholds for wage offers 
decrease).  Intuitively, both responses occur because the wage subsidy increases the 
attractiveness of a hire in the employer’s eyes, and both responses increase the per-period 
hiring probability.  The number of employers actually switching recruitment and wage-
offer strategies depends upon the distribution of employer types in the neighborhood of 
                                                          
26 The average hourly starting wage in the analysis sample is $7.88 in 1990 dollars.  This implies total 
earnings in the first two years of employment of about $49,833 in 2006 dollars, assuming a 40-hour 
workweek, a 51-week work year, and inflating from 1990 to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U.  The maximum 
credit an employer can receive under the WOTC is $2400 during a worker’s first two years, which is about 
4.8 percent of the worker’s total earnings of $49,833.  Given that the economic model assumes WL = 
0.7404 and WH = 1.1304, I compute an average starting wage of (0.587)WL + (0.413)WH = 0.9015, where 
the weights in this average are the fractions hired at the high and low wage in the baseline specification (see 
first column of Table 7).  Since this represents earnings over a three-week period, I multiple by 34 (the 
number of three-week periods in two 51-week work years) to get 30.651.  The amount of the subsidy in the 
counterfactual is about 4.8 percent of this, or 1.48.  
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the various γ-thresholds, as determined by αγ and βγ.  Panel A of Table 7 displays the 
transition matrix, expressed as percentages of row sums.  For example, 1178 employers 
chose formal methods with a wage-offer sequence of (WL, WL, WL) in the baseline.  
After the policy change, 36.08 percent remained with formal methods but switched to a 
wage-offer sequence of (WL, WL, WH), and 63.92 percent switched to informal methods 
and this new wage-offer sequence.  
Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 reveals that the WOTC increases the 
percentage of employers using informal methods from 32.9 percent to 49.4 percent, and 
the fraction of new hires starting at the low wage decreases from 57.3 percent to 52.5 
percent.  Table 9 disaggregates the information in Table 8 by recruitment choice, 
revealing that when formal methods are chosen the starting wage distribution shifts 
clearly to the right, whereas when informal methods are chosen the starting wage 
distribution shifts slightly to the left.  The leftward shift occurs because, as seen in the 
third quadrant of Panel A of Table 7, of the employers switching from formal to informal 
methods in response to the policy, more of them choose wage-offer sequences of (WL, 
WL, WH) than (WH, WH, WH).   
Table 8 reveals that the effect of the WOTC on vacancy duration is non-
monotonic (the fractions hired in period 1 and 3 increase, and the fractions hired in 
periods 2 and more than 3 decrease).  This result can be understood when the information 
is disaggregated by recruitment choice.  Table 9 reveals that when formal methods are 
chosen, vacancy durations shorten following the WOTC.  In contrast, when informal 
methods are chosen the effect on vacancy duration is non-monotonic (the percentage of 
campaigns that yields a hire in more than three periods decreases, but so does the 
percentage of campaigns that yields a hire in the first period).  To see why this happens, 
recall from Panel A of Table 7 that in the baseline, 536/(536+1109), or 32.6 percent, of 
employers using informal methods offered a high wage in periods 1 and 2, whereas after 
the policy this number was only 24.6 percent due to an influx of employers switching 
from formal to informal methods and tending to favor low wage offers in the first two 
periods.  That explains why, for workers hired via informal methods, the percentage hired 
in period 1 decreases following the policy change.  Table 7 also reveals that in the 
baseline 32.6 percent of employers using informal methods offered a high wage in the 
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third period, whereas after the policy change all employers choosing informal methods 
offer a high wage in the third period.  This explains the decrease in the percentage of 
(informal) recruitment campaigns that extend beyond three periods.   
Tables 10 and 11 display the “recruitment-constant” analogs of Tables 8 and 9, 
meaning I assume the employer is not allowed to switch recruitment strategies following 
the policy change.  Thus, Tables 8 and 9 represent the total effect of the policy changes, 
Tables 10 and 11 represent “pure wage effects” that operate only through the channel of 
changes in posted wage offers holding constant recruitment strategies, and the difference 
between the two sets of results is the “recruitment-wage effect.” 
Table 11 reveals a clear rightward shift in the starting wage distribution for 
workers hired via informal methods, in contrast to the slight leftward shift that was seen 
in the total effects of Table 9, highlighting the important effect of compositional changes 
on the distribution of starting wages when employers are able to change recruitment 
strategies in response to the wage subsidy.  In the total effects, the dramatic rightward 
shift in the starting wage distribution for those hired via formal methods implied a clear 
rightward shift in the overall starting wage distribution, despite the slight leftward shift in 
starting wages for those hired via informal methods.  In the recruitment-constant effects, 
the rightward shift in the overall starting wage distribution is more muted, despite the fact 
that starting wages now shift to the right for those hired via informal methods as well as 
for those hired via formal methods.  The reason is that rightward shift for those hired via 
formal methods is considerably smaller than it was in the total effects of Table 9.  Note 
also that the reason that the recruitment-constant rightward shift in the starting wage 
distribution is greater for employers using informal methods than for those using formal 
methods can be found in the estimated hiring probabilities in Table 3, which reveal that 
the return (in terms of the increase in the hiring probability) to posting a high wage rather 
than a low one is greater for informal methods than for formal methods.  Finally, 
regarding vacancy duration, the recruitment-constant effects are dampened relative to the 
total effects in Tables 8 and 9.   
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Simulation 2:  “Information Policies” (Workforce Investment Act of 1998) 
An “information policy” attempts to secure better matches for targeted worker 
types by enhancing the information available to employers about these workers.  An 
example of such a policy is the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA98), which 
targets low-skilled worker groups such as economically disadvantaged adults, youth and 
dislocated workers.  The Act attempts to unify and streamline federally-funded 
employment and training services by requiring them to be provided through a centralized 
single system at the local level called the One-Stop Center System.  A major function of 
the one-stop centers is matching job seekers to employers at the local level where the 
needs of businesses and individuals are best understood.  Employers recruiting through 
the one-stop centers should be privy to more and better information about workers and 
how well their skills match the specific needs of the firm.27  I model this policy as an 
exogenous increase in EθF, since using a one-stop center corresponds to formal 
recruitment methods and since the additional intensive information provided by these 
centers should improve the average match quality.  The magnitude of the increase in EθF 
that would result from a policy such as WIA98 is unclear, so I arbitrarily consider a small 
increase of only 1 percent (from 1 to 1.01).28      
The thresholds for γ in Table 5 reveal a shift from informal to formal methods and 
a shift towards higher posted wage offers when formal methods are chosen.  Both shifts 
                                                          
27 Localities are given autonomy to plan systems that best suit their local needs, so methods of 
implementation vary considerably across states and localities, though all centers actively seek to integrate 
the recruitment activities of local employers with those of the one-stop center.  Job seekers who require 
training services are channeled into programs that directly match the skill needs reported most in demand 
by local employers.  Many one-stop centers encourage employers to use the on-site facilities to recruit, 
interview, test, and train job candidates.  In some centers these functions are carried out via tele-
conferencing.  A common approach is to establish single points-of-contact or liaisons from the one-stop 
center to a business or business sector, so that one-stop employees can cultivate ongoing relationships with 
local employers and familiarize themselves with each employer’s specific needs.  The job matching 
function of the one-stop centers and the centralization of employment, training and recruitment services 
facilitates the acquisition of information for both employers and job seekers.   
 
28 The model is highly sensitive to changes in EθF.  Even an increase as small as 1 percent induces a 
dramatic shift towards formal methods, and an increase of slightly more than 1 percent would cause γ*FI1 
and γ*IF2 to coincide and thus disappear altogether, so that informal methods would be chosen only for 
values of γ between 0 and γ*IF1.  Also note that only small increases in EθF make sense in the context of the 
theoretical model, ceteris paribus.  For example, the model’s assumption that the employer screens more 
intensively when formal methods are used (i.e. takes the best of two draws from the match quality 
distribution given that a hire occurs) hinges on EθF being sufficiently less than EθI.  As EθF increases with 
EθI remaining fixed, this assumption regarding screening behavior becomes increasingly questionable. 
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arise because the policy increases the attractiveness of new hires, given that they are 
generated via formal methods.  Panel B of Table 7 reveals the actual transitions, which 
are substantial from informal to formal methods though small for increases in wage 
postings given that formal methods are chosen.  Tables 8 and 9 reveal a dramatic shift 
towards formal recruitment methods, a slightly lower overall starting wage distribution, 
slightly longer vacancy durations, higher starting wages and shorter vacancy durations for 
those workers hired via formal methods, and lower starting wages and longer vacancy 
durations for workers hired via informal methods.  Note that the striking decrease in the 
starting wage distribution for workers hired via informal methods occurs because of the 
change in composition (in terms of the chosen wage-offer sequences) of the employers 
who choose informal methods following the policy change, with a much smaller fraction 
of such employers offering sequences of (WH, WH, WH) after the change.   
Another interesting point is that the distribution of starting wages for all workers 
shifts slightly to the left, and vacancy durations increase slightly as a result of the policy, 
and both results might appear counterintuitive absent the insights offered by the structural 
model.  To see the intuition for these results, consider the row of the transition matrix 
corresponding to IHHH.  Only 6.53 percent of these employers remain with this strategy 
after the policy change, whereas 16.79 percent switch to FLHH and 76.68 percent switch 
to FHHH.  The switchers to FLHH can expect to pay lower starting wages (since some 
will hire in the first period at the low wage) and endure longer expected vacancy 
durations (both because of switching to the slower recruitment method and because of 
switching to a low wage offer in the first period).  Similarly, the switchers to FHHH can 
expect longer vacancy durations as a result of switching to the slower recruitment 
method.  This illustrates again the “recruitment-wage effect”, whereby substitution of 
employers across recruitment strategies in response to an exogenous policy or 
environmental change has implications for the overall distribution of starting wages (and 
also vacancy durations).  This is a key insight of the model.  As seen by comparing 
Tables 10 and 11 with Tables 8 and 9, virtually the entire change (to 3 significant digits) 
in the distributions of starting wages and vacancy duration following the policy change is 
due to shifts in employer recruitment behavior.        
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Simulation 3: Increase in Heterogeneity of Prospective Match Qualities 
Finally, consider an exogenous increase in σ, leaving E(θI) and E(θF) unchanged.  
This signifies an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of prospective match qualities in 
the labor market.  One interpretation is that this arises from a change in the demographics 
of potential applicants in the local labor market in which the employer operates that 
occurs over a long period of time.  Another interpretation is that the same employer opens 
a new establishment in a different regional labor market.  Employer recruitment decisions 
are quite sensitive to changes in σ, and an increase of about 5.5 percent in this parameter 
would cause γ*FI1 and γ*IF2 to coincide (and therefore disappear) so that informal methods 
would only be chosen for values of γ between 0 and γ*IF1.  I consider a more modest 
increase of 5 percent in the estimated σ.    
Changes in the thresholds γ*IF1, γ*FI1, and γ*IF2 in Table 5 reveal a shift in the 
direction of formal methods, arising because the benefits to the employer of sampling the 
second order statistic of θF are increasing in σ.  Furthermore, though the changes are 
negligible and can rarely be discerned with only 3 significant digits, the remaining γ 
thresholds decrease for formal methods and increase for informal methods.29  Thus, an 
increase in the heterogeneity of potential matches induces some employers to switch from 
informal to formal methods.  Those remaining with informal methods are less likely than 
before to raise wage offers during the recruitment campaign since (due to concavity in the 
production function) they are less eager to attract matches of more uncertain quality.  
Those who remain with formal methods are more likely than before to raise wage offers 
during the recruitment campaign, since the expected value of the second order statistic of 
θF is increasing in the variance of θF, making the employer more eager to fill the position.   
Panel C of Table 7 quantifies these predicted substitutions.  Tables 8 and 9 reveal 
a dramatic shift towards formal methods, a slight leftward shift in the starting wage 
distribution, and a slight lengthening of vacancy durations.  For workers hired via 
informal methods there is a clear leftward shift in the starting wage distribution and a 
                                                          
29 For example, in period 3 the equations [ ] [ ]' )2( ')2( 33 θθ γγ FF MM FF EE = and 
define the new wage thresholds, γ’[ ] [ ]' ' 33 θθ γγ II MM II EE = F3 and γ’I3, following the increase in 
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lengthening of vacancy durations, both arising from the change in composition (in terms 
of their wage-offer sequences) for employers who remain with informal methods after the 
change.  For workers hired via formal methods, the starting wage distribution shifts to the 
right and vacancy durations decrease.  As was the case for WIA98, the somewhat 
surprising results that the starting wage distribution for all workers shifts to the left and 
the vacancy duration lengthens after the change are easily explained by the model (in 
particular the substitutions from IHHH to FLHH and FHHH, as revealed in Panel C of 
Table 7) and offer another example of the recruitment-wage effect.  Comparing Tables 10 
and 11 with Tables 8 and 9, we see that the changes in starting wages and vacancy 
duration following the environmental changes are due to shifts in recruitment behavior. 
 
 VI. CONCLUSION  
As the sole means of generating a pool of job applicants, the choice of recruitment 
strategy is an important problem an employer faces in the process of hiring a new worker.  
Nevertheless, recruitment behavior is a relatively neglected area of research in labor 
economics.  A complete understanding of the effects of policy and environmental 
changes affecting hiring processes requires a theoretical framework predicting how 
employers will respond by adjusting their recruitment strategies.  This paper is the first to 
estimate a dynamic structural model in which recruitment choice is endogenous, 
exploiting a large cross-sectional establishment-level data set, the Multi-City Study of 
Urban Inequality.  By providing a framework for analyzing how recruitment behavior 
affects labor market outcomes, I have aimed to partially bridge the gap in our knowledge 
of an area of obvious interest to economists, policymakers, and employers, and to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the effect of information and employer behavior 
on the job matching process.  Furthermore, as seen in Table 8, the structural model 
successfully predicts two of the basic empirical observations from Section II, namely that 
secretaries hired via informal methods are hired fasted and at lower starting wages than 
those hired via formal methods.  The observation that secretaries hired via informal 
methods start at a lower wage than those hired via formal methods might seem 
                                                                                                                                                                             
σ, where θF’ and θI’ denote the match-qualities under formal and informal methods, respectively, 
following the increase in σ.  It is clear from these expressions that γF3’ < γF3 and γI3’ > γI3.   
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counterintuitive, given the conventional wisdom that informal methods yield better 
matches on average, but this result is easily understood in light of the structural model.   
Although the model presented here assumes only one worker type, an extension to 
multiple worker types is straightforward as is shown in a similar model in DeVaro 
(2001).  A promising line of future work would be to apply a model with multiple worker 
types (differentiated by race, ethnicity, or gender) to analyze the effects of affirmative 
action policies on the hiring process.  In such an analysis it would be profitable to model 
job seekers’ selection of job search methods, since these methods sometimes vary 
considerably by personal characteristics such as race, age, gender, and educational 
attainment.  Although the issue of selection on the part of job seekers is not treated in this 
paper, it implicitly underlies the employer’s recognition that certain recruitment activities 
are more likely than others to generate workers of a particular match quality.  Thus, if the 
employer seeks a certain worker-type the recruitment choice is a powerful mechanism 
influencing the probability of a successful hire.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Recruitment Method  
 Informal Formal Difference 
Vacancy Duration (Weeks) 2.630 
(0.190) 
3.637 
(0.280) 
-1.006 
(0.338) 
Real Hourly Starting Wage ($1990) 7.546 
(0.145) 
8.097 
(0.132) 
-0.552 
(0.196) 
Number of Applicants 25.737 
(6.028) 
176.135 
(110.034) 
-150.398 
(110.199) 
Number of Interviews 7.827 
(1.548) 
11.345 
(0.952) 
-3.518 
(1.817) 
Total sample size = NI + NF = 917 NI = 291 NF = 626  
Notes:  Cell entries are means, with standard errors in parentheses.  Sample is 917 
clerical workers.  First column is the subsample generated via informal methods, and second  
column is the subsample generated by some other means (e.g. newspaper advertisements).  All 
statistics are computed using sampling weights.   
 
Table 2:  Relationship Between Changes in Recruitment and Screening Methods  
Dependent Variable = 0 if informal recruitment methods are used less often now than 5-10 years ago,  
= 1 if no change, = 2 if used more now than 5-10 years ago  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interview Less? 0.936 
(0.522) 
● ● ● ● 0.931 
(0.498) 
Test Less? ● 0.345 
(0.237) 
● ● ● 0.238 
(0.243) 
Check References Less? ● ● 0.116 
(0.320) 
● ● -0.179 
(0.358) 
Check Educational Record Less? ● ● ● 0.554 
(0.175) 
● 0.523 
(0.200) 
Check Criminal Record Less? ● ● ● ● 0.235 
(0.142) 
0.055 
(0.160) 
Notes:  Results are from 6 ordered probit models.  Sample is 917 clerical workers.  Dependent variable 
is 3-valued indicator of whether recruitment methods (for the position in which the most recent worker 
started) are used less often, as often, or more often as of the survey date compared with 5 – 10 years ago. 
Independent variables are binary indicators for whether particular screening methods are used less often 
as of the survey date compared with 5 – 10 years ago.  All models use sampling weights. 
 
Table 3: Structural Parameter Estimates1
Parameters Asymptotic Standard Errors 
M = 20.144 4.752 
αγ = 0.651 0.005 
βγ = 0.961 0.011 
μ = 1.131 0.036 
σ = 0.445 0.005 
pIH = 0.959 0.024 
pIL = 0.673 0.031 
pFH = 0.809 0.021 
pFL = 0.647 0.030 
1I imposed these restrictions when estimating the model: 
WH = 1.1304; WL = 0.7404; pIH > pIL; pFH > pFL; pIH > pFH; 
pIL > pFL; E(θF) = 1; E(θI) = μ > 1; Var(θI) = Var(θF) = σ;  
and β = 1, where β is the one-period discount factor. 
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Table 4:  Goodness of Fit 
Cell Recruitment Strategy Hiring Period Starting Wage % Observed % Predicted 
1 Informal Methods Period 1 High 10.43 9.90 
2 Informal Methods Period 2 High 3.04 0.70 
3 Informal Methods Period 3 High 0.87 0.00 
4 Informal Methods Period 1 Low 15.45 15.60 
5 Informal Methods Period 2 Low 2.71 3.70 
6 Informal Methods Period 3 Low 0.87 1.10 
7 Informal Methods Not Hired -- 0.03 0.70 
8 Formal Methods Period 1 High 20.66 19.70 
9 Formal Methods Period 2 High 8.61 8.30 
10 Formal Methods Period 3 High 3.16 1.80 
11 Formal Methods Period 1 Low 28.23 27.20 
12 Formal Methods Period 2 Low 4.54 7.80 
13 Formal Methods Period 3 Low 1.28 2.00 
14 Formal Methods Not Hired -- 0.13 1.50 
Note:  The model cannot be rejected on the basis of a chi-square test of goodness of fit.  The test statistic is 
0.5×Q×N = 0.889, where Q = 0.0023 is the value of the minimized distance function, and N = 770 is the 
sample size.  Test statistic is distributed χ2(n-k-1) where n is the number of cells (14) and k is the number of 
estimated parameters (9).  p-value = 0.926.     
 
 
Table 5:  Estimated Thresholds for γ  
 Baseline WOTC WIA98 Heterogeneity 
γ*IF1 0.100 0.223 0.087 0.088 
γI3 0.233 0.000 0.233 0.233 
γF3 0.311 0.058 0.310 0.311 
γI2 0.345 0.338 0.345 0.345 
γF2 0.415 0.395 0.414 0.414 
γI1 0.430 0.429 0.430 0.430 
γ*FI1 0.478 0.471 0.498 0.498 
γF1 0.501 0.498 0.500 0.500 
γ*IF2 0.604 0.615 0.506 0.509 
Note:  See Propositions 1 and 2 for definitions of these thresholds.  The 
baseline thresholds use the parameter estimates in Table 3, whereas those in 
the subsequent 3 columns reflect an exogenous change to one of the parameters. 
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Table 6:  Summary Statistics for Marginal Effects from Monte-Carlo Experiments 
               % Informal                  % WH                % Hired in 1         % Hired in 2        % Hired in 3 
α1
-0.574 
[-0.575] 
(0.101) 
-0.600 
0.573 
[0.558] 
(0.219) 
0.558 
0.180 
[0.190] 
(0.423) 
0.730 
-0.143 
[-0.165] 
(0.426) 
-0.700 
-0.002 
[0.020] 
(0.238) 
0.100 
β1
0.352 
[0.360] 
(0.091) 
0.670 
-0.523 
[-0.516] 
(0.221) 
-0.346 
-0.158 
[-0.130] 
(0.439) 
-0.140 
0.121 
[0.125] 
(0.435) 
0.130 
0.053 
[0.050] 
(0.199) 
0.120 
M 
0.583 
[0.580] 
(0.071) 
0.690 
0.291 
[0.288] 
(0.058) 
0.325 
0.131 
[0.130] 
(0.043) 
0.100 
-0.085 
[-0.090] 
(0.039) 
-0.050 
-0.030 
[-0.030] 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
σ 
-4.790 
[-4.780] 
(0.102) 
-4.740 
-0.395 
[-0.383] 
(0.067) 
-0.339 
-0.717 
[-0.720] 
(0.100) 
-0.670 
0.520 
[0.520] 
(0.085) 
0.470 
0.149 
[0.145] 
(0.063) 
0.130 
μ 
32.394 
[32.425] 
(0.452) 
32.290 
2.169 
[2.176] 
(0.117) 
2.168 
4.628 
[4.620] 
(0.252) 
4.380 
-3.412 
[-3.410] 
 (0.242) 
-3.180 
-0.912 
[-0.910] 
(0.109) 
-0.940 
pIH
10.425 
[10.430] 
(0.092) 
10.360 
1.201 
[1.198] 
(0.085) 
1.331 
2.193 
[2.190] 
(0.129) 
2.060 
-1.724 
[-1.720] 
 (0.111) 
-1.620 
-0.381 
[-0.390] 
(0.062) 
-0.320 
pFL
-12.338 
[-12.320] 
(0.223) 
-12.750 
-2.312 
[-2.274] 
(0.160) 
-2.439 
-0.227 
[-0.250] 
(0.200) 
-0.120 
0.226 
[0.205] 
(0.179) 
0.030 
0.017 
[0.020] 
(0.133) 
0.130 
pFH
-9.837 
[-9.830] 
(0.415) 
-10.450 
0.298 
[0.295] 
(0.091) 
0.230 
-0.859 
[-0.850] 
(0.164) 
-1.040 
0.861 
[0.850] 
(0.154) 
0.910 
0.052 
[0.040] 
(0.066) 
0.190 
pIL
11.779 
[11.760] 
(0.142) 
12.120 
-0.128 
[-0.124] 
(0.043) 
-0.088 
0.776 
[0.760] 
(0.250) 
0.820 
-0.172 
[-0.170] 
 (0.204) 
-0.250 
-0.317 
[-0.320] 
(0.125) 
-0.370 
Notes: Using the parameter estimates in Table 3, 100 data sets of size 5,000 were generated and the 
parameters were estimated.  For each of the resulting 100 parameter vectors, parameter j was increased by 
2% and a data set of size 10,000 was generated to produce the fraction using informal recruiting methods, 
the fraction starting at the high wage, the fraction hired in period 1, the fraction hired in period 2, and the 
fraction hired in period 3.  From these were subtracted the corresponding fractions when parameter j was 
not increased.  Cell ij in the table contains 4 numbers.  The first is the mean (across the 100 Monte Carlo 
replications) marginal effect of parameter i on moment j.  The second, in brackets, is the median.  The 
third, in parentheses, is the standard deviation.  The fourth, in italics, is the marginal effect computed 
analogously but using the estimates in Table 3 (based on the real data rather than the Monte Carlo data).  
Sample sizes of 10,000 were used in all cases.  All cell entries are multiplied by 100 for easier reading.  
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Table 7:  Transition Percentages Following a Policy Change 
 
Panel A: Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) 
 ILLL ILLH ILHH IHHH FLLL FLLH FLHH FHHH Total 
ILLL 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1109 
ILLH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ILHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IHHH 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 536 
FLLL 0 63.92 0 0 0 36.08 0 0 1178 
FLLH 0 0 0 0 0 82.88 17.12 0 473 
FLHH 0 0 0 10.37 0 0 89.63 0 270 
FHHH 0 0 0 2.93 0 0 0 97.07 1434 
 
Panel B: Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA98) 
 ILLL ILLH ILHH IHHH FLLL FLLH FLHH FHHH Total 
ILLL 90.26 0 0 0 9.74 0 0 0 1109 
ILLH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ILHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IHHH 0 0 0 6.53 0 0 16.79 76.68 536 
FLLL 0 0 0 0 99.49 0.51 0 0 1178 
FLLH 0 0 0 0 0 98.94 1.06 0 473 
FLHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 270 
FHHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 1434 
 
Panel C: Increase in heterogeneity of potential match qualities (σ-increase) 
 ILLL ILLH ILHH IHHH FLLL FLLH FLHH FHHH Total 
ILLL 90.62 0 0 0 9.38 0 0 0 1109 
ILLH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ILHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IHHH 0 0 0 8.58 0 0 16.79 74.63 536 
FLLL 0 0 0 0 99.75 0.25 0 0 1178 
FLLH 0 0 0 0 0 99.37 0.63 0 473 
FLHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 270 
FHHH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 1434 
Notes:  In each panel the row titles correspond to baseline recruitment strategies, and the column titles refer 
to post-policy recruitment strategies.  Each strategy is described by 4 letters.  The first (I or F) denotes the  
recruitment strategy.  The second, third, and fourth, denote the wage-offers in Periods 1, 2, and 3.  Thus, a 
strategy of FLLH uses formal recruitment methods, low wage offers in Periods 1 and 2 and a high wage 
offer in Period 3.  Row percentages sum to 100.  The last column gives the number of simulated 
recruitment campaigns (out of 5000) for which the row-title strategy was chosen in the baseline case.  Thus, 
the counts in the last column sum to 5000, the total number of simulated recruitment campaigns.
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Table 8: Distributions of Outcomes Based on Simulated Data 
 Baseline WOTC WIA98 σ-Increase 
Recruitment        
   %Informal 32.9% 49.4% 20.7% 21.0% 
   %Formal 67.1% 50.6% 79.3% 79.0% 
Starting Wage        
   Low  57.3% 52.5% 58.5% 58.5% 
   High  42.8% 47.5%   41.5% 41.5% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 74.1% 74.8% 72.4% 72.4% 
   Hired in Period 2 18.1% 17.8% 19.5% 19.4% 
   Hired in Period 3 5.6%   6.6% 5.9% 5.9% 
   Hired after Period 3 2.2%   0.7% 2.2% 2.2% 
Notes:  Based on 5000 simulated recruitment campaigns. 
 
 
Table 9: Distributions of Outcomes by Recruitment Strategy 
 Baseline WOTC WIA98 σ-Increase
INFORMAL METHODS     
Starting Wage        
   Low Wage 66.5% 67.8% 96.5% 95.4% 
   High Wage 33.5% 32.2% 3.5% 4.6% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 77.6% 75.5% 70.0% 70.0% 
   Hired in Period 2 15.0% 16.5% 19.0% 19.0% 
   Hired in Period 3 4.7% 7.5% 7.0% 7.0% 
   Hired after Period 3 2.7% 0.5% 4.0% 4.0% 
FORMAL METHODS        
Starting Wage        
   Low Wage 52.8% 37.5% 48.8% 48.9% 
   High Wage 47.3% 62.5% 51.2% 51.1% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 72.4% 74.2% 73.1% 73.1% 
   Hired in Period 2 19.6% 19.0% 19.6% 19.6% 
   Hired in Period 3 6.1% 5.8% 5.6% 5.7% 
   Hired after Period 3 1.9% 1.0% 1.7% 1.7% 
Notes:  Based on 5000 simulated recruitment campaigns. 
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Table 10: “Recruitment-Constant” Distributions of Simulated Outcomes 
 Baseline WOTC WIA98 σ-Increase 
Recruitment        
   %Informal 32.9% 32.9% 32.9% 32.9% 
   %Formal 67.1% 67.1% 67.1% 67.1% 
Starting Wage        
   Low  57.3% 52.6% 57.3% 57.3% 
   High  42.8% 47.4% 42.8% 42.8% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 
   Hired in Period 2 18.1% 18.2% 18.1% 18.1% 
   Hired in Period 3 5.6% 6.8% 5.6% 5.6% 
   Hired after Period 3 2.2% 1.0% 2.2% 2.2% 
Notes:  Based on 5000 simulated recruitment campaigns.  The second, third, and fourth columns reflect the 
distributions of starting wages and vacancy duration that would arise if employers remained with their 
original recruitment choice after the policy change. 
 
 
 
Table 11: “Recruitment-Constant” Distributions by Recruitment Choice 
 Baseline WOTC WIA98 σ-Increase 
INFORMAL METHODS     
Starting Wage        
   Low Wage 66.5% 60.2% 66.5% 66.5% 
   High Wage 33.5% 39.8% 33.5% 33.5% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 77.6% 77.6% 77.6% 77.6% 
   Hired in Period 2 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 
   Hired in Period 3 4.7% 7.1% 4.7% 4.7% 
   Hired after Period 3 2.7% 0.4% 2.7% 2.7% 
FORMAL METHODS        
Starting Wage        
   Low Wage 52.8% 48.9% 52.8% 52.8% 
   High Wage 47.3% 51.1% 47.3% 47.3% 
Vacancy Duration        
   Hired in Period 1 72.4% 72.4% 72.4% 72.4% 
   Hired in Period 2 19.6% 19.7% 19.6% 19.6% 
   Hired in Period 3 6.1% 6.7% 6.1% 6.1% 
   Hired after Period 3 1.9% 1.2% 1.9% 1.9% 
Notes:  Based on 5000 simulated recruitment campaigns.  The second, third, and fourth 
columns reflect the distributions of starting wages and vacancy duration that would arise if 
employers remained with their original recruitment choice after the policy change. 
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Figure 1: Relationship of Vacancy Duration and Starting Wage (Unconditional)
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Note:  Slope coefficient of regression of vacancy duration (measured in weeks) on a constant and the 
starting wage.  Horizontal axis gives the subsample over which the regression was run.  For example, “4” 
indicates that the sample includes only those employers who filled the position in less than four weeks. 
95% confidence intervals are also plotted for each coefficient. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship of Vacancy Duration and Starting Wage (Conditional)
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Note:  Slope coefficient of regression of vacancy duration (measured in weeks) on a constant, the 
starting wage, establishment size, number of sites of operation, whether the establishment is a franchise, the 
fraction of union workers, industry controls, occupation controls, and whether the position requires a 
college degree.  Horizontal axis gives the subsample over which the regression was run.  For example, “4” 
indicates that the sample includes only those employers who filled the position in less than four weeks. 
95% confidence intervals are also plotted for each coefficient. 
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Figure 3:  Histogram of γ Based on 400,000 Draws Using Parameter Estimates in Table 3 
 
Notes:  Dark lined (light solid) shaded regions for γ correspond to a choice of informal (formal) 
recruitment methods.  Solid line depicts V1I and dotted line depicts V1F, both evaluated at the   
estimated parameters (Table 3).  Right-vertical axis is for the value function and is adjusted so the  
intersections of V1I and V1F can be seen easily.  Actual γ* cutoffs are displayed in Table 5. 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Suppose that informal methods are chosen, since the argument 
for formal methods differs only in notation.  In period 3 the employer chooses WH if and 
only if (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH] > [E(MθI)γ – WL].  Note that both the left-hand and right-
hand sides of this inequality are functions of γ, defined on [0,1], that are monotonically 
increasing and convex in γ, crossing at most once, with the function on the left-hand side 
increasing more rapidly than the function on the right-hand side.  γI3 = 0 if and only if the 
inequality holds ׊γ, and γI3 = 1 if and only if there is no value of γ for which the 
inequality holds.  Otherwise, γI3 is in (0,1) and is the value of γ that solves the equation 
(pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH] = [E(MθI)γ – WL].  Similar arguments define γI2 and γI1, though 
the relevant inequalities describing when WH is chosen in periods 2 and 1 are 
(pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH – βV3I/(1+β)] > E(MθI)γ – WL – βV3I/(1+β) and (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – 
WH – βV2I/(1+β+β2)] > E(MθI)γ – WL – βV2I/(1+β+β2), respectively.  For the preceding 
two inequalities, both the left-hand and right-hand sides are functions of γ, defined on 
[0,1], that are monotonically increasing and convex in γ, crossing at most once, with the 
function on the left-hand side increasing more rapidly than the function on the right-hand 
side. 
   
If γI3 = 0, then γI2 ≥ γI3.  If γI3 = 1, then (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH] ≤ [E(MθI)γ – WL] ׊γ.  This 
implies (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH – βV3I/(1+β)] ≤ E(MθI)γ – WL – βV3I/(1+β) ׊γ, so γI2 = 1.  
Recall that, if 0 < γI3 < 1 and 0 < γI2 < 1, γI3 is the value of γ that solves (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – 
WH] – [E(MθI)γ – WL] = 0, whereas γI2 is the value of γ that solves (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – 
WH] – [E(MθI)γ – WL] = (pIH/pIL – 1)βV3I/(1+β).  The right-hand side of the preceding 
equation is positive, and the left-hand side would equal zero if evaluated at γ = γI3, so γI3 
< γI2, since the left-hand side of the equation is monotonically increasing in γ. 
 
If γI2 = 0, then γI1 ≥ γI2.  If γI2 = 1, then (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH – βV3I/(1+β)] ≤ E(MθI)γ – 
WL – βV3I/(1+β) ׊γ.  This implies (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH – βV2I/(1+β+β2)] ≤ [E(MθI)γ – 
WL – βV2I/(1+β+β2)] ׊γ, since V2I(0) > V3I(1+β+β2)/(1+β), so γI1 = 1.  To see that V2I > 
V3I(1+β+β2)/(1+β), as claimed in the preceding sentence, consider the case β = 1 (the 
most difficult case, since the RHS is largest) so that the inequality becomes V2I > 
(3/2)V3I.  Comparing the expressions for V2I and V3I when β = 1, it is clear that simply by 
making the same wage offer in Period 2 that is optimal in Period 3 (even if such a wage 
offer is not optimal in Period 2) the employer guarantees that the maximand of V2I is 
more than twice the maximand of V3I, so that the inequality V2I > (3/2)V3I must hold, and 
therefore V2I > V3I(1+β+β2)/(1+β) must also hold.  Recall that, if 0 < γI2 < 1 and 0 < γI1 < 
1, γI2 is the value of γ that solves (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH ] – [E(MθI)γ – WL] = (pIH/pIL – 
1)βV3I(0)/(1+β), whereas γI1 is the value of γ that solves (pIH/pIL)[E(MθI)γ – WH] – 
[E(MθI)γ – WL] = (pIH/pIL – 1)βV2I/(1+β+β2)].  Since V2I > V3I(1+β+β2)/(1+β), γI2 < γI1 
since the left-hand side of the preceding equation is monotonically increasing in γ.   
 
The preceding statements collectively imply 0 ≤ γI3 ≤ γI2 ≤ γI1 ≤ 1, and the last sentence of 
the proposition follows directly from the definitions of the γIt.  ⁮     
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 Proof of Proposition 2:   
 
Given the parameters, employer i with γ = γi chooses informal methods if max[V1I, V1F] 
= V1I, formal methods if max[V1I, V1F] = V1F, and is indifferent between the two methods 
if max[V1I, V1F] = V1I = V1F.  Furthermore, max[V1I, V1F] > 0 for all γ, given that is 
assumed to be always profitable to search (i.e. to choose a recruitment method and post a 
wage).  This verifies the first statement.   
 
See Table 3 for an example of a set of parameters for which both strategies are potentially 
observable in the labor market.  Alternatively, suppose that the differences between 
informal and formal methods both in hiring probabilities and in the means of θI and θF are 
small but that σ is large.  Since the value of sampling the second order statistic of θF 
increases in the variance of θF, for sufficiently large values of σ only formal methods will 
be chosen regardless of γ.  Alternatively, suppose that the hiring probabilities are near 
zero for formal methods and near one for informal methods.  Then for most 
configurations of the remaining parameters, only informal methods will be chosen 
regardless of the value of γ.  These 3 examples verify the first part of the second 
statement.   
 
To verify the second part of the second statement, and also the third statement, observe 
that given the parameter values both V1I and V1F are continuous and monotonically 
increasing in γ on the interval [0,1], since the expressions for expected per-period profit 
(regardless of recruitment choice) are continuous and monotonically increasing in γ on 
the interval [0,1].  Thus, if V1I lies everywhere above (below) V1F on [0,1], all employers 
choose informal (formal) methods, so there cannot exist thresholds of type γ*IFk or of type 
γ*FIk in [0,1], and if V1I crosses V1F from above (below), the value of γ at the intersection 
is a threshold of type γ*IFk (γ*FIk).  If a threshold is of type γ*IFk (γ*FIk) all employers with 
values of γ above this (until the next threshold of the opposite type, if one exists) choose 
formal (informal) methods and all employers with values of γ below this (until the next 
threshold of the opposite type, if one exists) choose informal (formal) methods.  Thus, the 
set of all thresholds of either type partitions the interval [0,1] into subintervals that 
alternate between the two recruitment methods.             
 
Condition to Ensure Positive Expected Profit from Searching: 
 
Positive expected profit from search using informal methods and a low wage offer 
requires EθIγ > WL/Mγ.  Given that θI is distributed lognormal, EθI = exp(μ1+σ12/2), or μ = 
exp(μ1+σ12/2), or μ1 = ln(μ) – σ12/2, where μ1 and σ12 are the mean and variance of ln(θI).  
It can be shown that EθIγ = exp(γμ1+γ2σ12/2).  Thus, the required condition is 
exp(γμ1+γ2σ12/2) > WL/Mγ, or γ(1 – γ)σ12 < 2[ln((Mμ)γ/WL)].  The preceding inequality 
holds if γ equals 0 or 1, since its right-hand side is positive given the assumptions WL < 
1, μ > 1, and M ≥ 1.  If 0 < γ < 1, then the inequality holds if σ12 < m(γ; M,μ,WL) where 
m =  2ln((Mμ)γ/WL)/[γ(1 – γ)].  Now, using σ2 = (exp(σ12) – 1)exp(2μ1 + σ12) and μ1 = 
ln(μ) – σ12/2, the required condition on σ12 can be restated as σ2 < k(γ; M,μ,WL) where k 
= μ2[exp(m) – 1].  Thus, for the case of a lognormal θI, any employer can always 
guarantee a positive expected profit from searching (by choosing informal methods and a 
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 low wage offer) as long as σ2 is not too large.  Let γ0 denote the value of γ that minimizes 
m (and k).  The following first-order condition of m with respect to γ defines γ0:  
γ02ln(Mμ) + ln(WL)(1 – 2γ0) = 0.  It can be shown, after some algebra, that the second-
order condition is satisfied, so that γ0 is a minimum.  In the estimation, the constraint on σ 
never comes close to binding.  The constraint was not imposed in estimation, and the 
result (fixing WL = 0.7404) was M = 20.144 and μ = 1.131, implying γ0 ≈ 0.228, which in 
turn implies m ≈ 11.514.  Thus, the smallest value of the upper bound on σ (given the 
values of M, μ, and WL) is k1/2 ≈ (128,010)1/2 ≈ 357.785, and the estimated value of σ is 
0.445.  Intuitively, the reason the constraint on σ that ensures positive expected profit is 
never relevant in the estimation is that the second order statistic of θI increases rapidly in 
σ, so that σ must be relatively small, since otherwise formal methods would always be the 
dominant recruitment strategy. ⁮              
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 APPENDIX B 
 
The tables below are based on the subsample of 719 workers in “marketing, sales, 
and service” occupations in positions not requiring a college degree (392 are in services 
and 327 are in marketing and sales). The results are roughly similar in many respects to 
those for clerical workers but with some differences.  As seen in Table B.1, average 
vacancy duration is longer for workers hired via formal methods than via informal 
methods, and the applicant pool is larger as measured by the number of applicants and 
number of interviews for the position into which the most recent worker was hired.  
However, starting wages are only negligibly higher for formal methods than for informal 
methods.  The pattern of structural estimates in Table B.2 does not differ dramatically 
from those in Table 3 based on clerical workers, though there are some differences.  For 
example, the estimated value of M is lower in Table B.2 than in Table 3, though note that 
I fix WH and WL at lower values in the new occupational subsample, since workers in this 
group have lower average wages than clericals.  As with clerical workers, I set these 
values so that WH/WL equals the corresponding ratio of the 0.75 and 0.25 quantiles of the 
actual starting wage distribution for workers in this occupational aggregate.  As seen in 
Table B.3, the fit is not quite as good in this subsample as in the subsample of clericals.   
 
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics by Recruitment Method  
 Informal Formal Difference 
Vacancy Duration (Weeks) 1.586 
(0.137) 
1.739 
(0.098) 
-0.153 
(0.168) 
Real Hourly Starting Wage ($1990) 6.189 
(0.186) 
6.219 
(0.168) 
-0.030 
(0.251) 
Number of Applicants 26.289 
(8.319) 
52.511 
(13.079) 
-26.222 
(15.501) 
Number of Interviews 7.713 
(2.055) 
14.286 
(3.871) 
-6.573 
(4.383) 
Total sample size = NI + NF = 719 NI = 256 NF = 463  
Notes:  Cell entries are means, with standard errors in parentheses.  First column is the  
subsample generated via informal methods, and second column is the subsample generated  
by some other means (e.g. newspaper advertisements).  Sampling weights are used. 
 
Table B.2: Structural Parameter Estimates1
Parameters Asymptotic Standard Errors 
M = 17.024 2.363 
αγ = 0.666 0.102 
βγ = 0.965 0.003 
μ = 1.107 0.013 
σ = 0.440 0.028 
pIH = 0.980 0.131 
pIL = 0.633 0.092 
pFH = 0.801 0.101 
pFL = 0.655 0.100 
1The restrictions imposed in estimation are:  WH = 0.8952;  
WL = 0.5148; pIH > pIL; pFH > pFL; pIH > pFH; pIL > pFL;  
E(θF) = 1; E(θI) = μ > 1; Var(θI) = Var(θF) = σ; and β = 1. 
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 Table B.3:  Goodness of Fit 
Cell Recruitment Strategy Hiring Period Starting Wage % Observed % Predicted 
1 Informal Methods Period 1 High 13.49 12.10 
2 Informal Methods Period 2 High 2.82 0.30 
3 Informal Methods Period 3 High 1.07 0.00 
4 Informal Methods Period 1 Low 15.85 13.80 
5 Informal Methods Period 2 Low 0.94 4.70 
6 Informal Methods Period 3 Low 0.15 1.10 
7 Informal Methods Not Hired -- 0.16 0.50 
8 Formal Methods Period 1 High 24.73 23.10 
9 Formal Methods Period 2 High 5.85 6.60 
10 Formal Methods Period 3 High 2.13 1.80 
11 Formal Methods Period 1 Low 31.56 26.10 
12 Formal Methods Period 2 Low 0.79 7.00 
13 Formal Methods Period 3 Low 0.46 1.50 
14 Formal Methods Not Hired -- 0.00 1.40 
Note:  The model cannot be rejected on the basis of a chi-square test of goodness of fit.  The test statistic is 
0.5×Q×N = 3.651, where Q = 0.0102 is the value of the minimized distance function, and N = 719 is the 
sample size.  Test statistic is distributed χ2(n-k-1) where n is the number of cells (14) and k is the number of 
estimated parameters (9).  p-value = 0.455.     
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